In a two-period model with two groups of countries that extract, trade and consume fossil fuel, a climate coalition fights against climate damage by purchasing or leasing deposits to prevent their extraction, and seeks to manipulate the fuel prices in its favor. The deposit-purchase policy is inefficient since it leaves the first-period climate damage externality non-internalized, which is in stark contrast to the efficiency of the deposit-purchase policy in static models. However, for a subset of economies the deposit-lease policy turns out to be efficient. It internalizes the climate damage externalities and makes strategic action in the fuel markets ineffective. Finally, we compare the deposit-lease policy and the deposit-purchase policy in an empirically calibrated economy. If strategic action pays in the fuel markets, a transition from the deposit-purchase policy to the deposit-lease policy increases the coalition's welfare if the discount rate is small. JEL classification: F55, H23, Q54, Q58
Introduction
The climate problem is one of the most important challenges facing the world today. To stabilize the world climate at safe levels the world global warming should be kept below 2
• C. At the Paris Agreement governments agreed to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 • C. Allen et al. (2009) have shown that there is a strong correlation between the maximum level of global warming and cumulative greenhouse gas emissions. Rogelj et al. (2011) and Walsh et al. (2017) have pointed out that staying below the 2 • C global temperature limit not only depends on cumulative emissions but also on the emissions path.
However, the recent withdraw of the U.S at the Paris Agreement impressively shows that global cooperation is hard to achieve due to strong free-rider incentives. That raises the question whether unilateral action of a (sub-global) climate coalition is able to achieve firstbest solutions.
The economic literature has mainly analyzed demand-side climate policies. The problem inherent in demand-side policies is that they cause carbon leakage and may lead to a green paradox. Carbon leakage occurs when a country's unilateral emission reductions are offset by increased emissions in other countries. If the unilateral reductions are more than offset then a green paradox arises. Felder and Rutherford (1993) , Hoel (1996 ), Babiker (2005 , Copeland and Taylor (2005) , Gerlagh (2011) , Burniaux and Martins (2012) and Baylis et al. (2014) provide interesting insights into various channels and determinants of carbon leakage. Unilateral demand-side policies in intertemporal models with fossil fuel supply have been studied by Hoel (2011) , Eichner and Pethig (2011) , Grafton et al. (2012) , van der Meijden et al. (2015) and van der Ploeg (2016) . In different models with alternative assumptions (renewable resource as a perfect substitute, homothetic preferences, extraction costs, exploration investments etc.) these papers show that unilateral demand-side policies are always second-best and hence the efficient allocation is missed.
Whereas the economic literature on demand-side policies is large there are only few papers dealing with supply-side policies, and hence up to date supply-side policies are underresearched and not well understood. Bohm (1993) pointed out that carbon leakage could be reduced if a climate coalition would buy or lease deposits from non-signatories and preserve them from extraction. Hoel (1994) determines the second-best mix of demand-side and supply-side caps (or taxes). In numerical analyses Golombek et al. (1995) and Faehn et al. (2017) further illustrate the second-best mix of demand-side and supply-side policies. Bohm (1993) , Hoel (1994) , Golombek et al. (1995) and Faehn et al. (2017) apply static models.
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Harstad (2012) extends Hoel's (1994) analysis by trading fossil fuel deposits. Especially, he shows that a (sub-global) climate coalition can buy deposits such that the first-best allocation is implemented. The deposit transactions kill two birds with one stone. They internalize the climate damage externality and eliminate strategic action in the fuel market. The internalization of the climate damage externality requires purchasing deposits for preservation, and to eliminate strategic action deposits are purchased and extracted by the coalition which anyway would have been extracted by the deposit sellers. Since it is questionable whether in the real world a climate coalition purchases deposits for extraction (to eliminate strategic effects), Eichner and Pethig (2017a) have investigated in a static setting whether purchasing deposits with the only purpose to prevent them from exploitation is sufficient to achieve first-best. They have shown that there exist a subset of economies at which deposit purchases for preservation implement efficiency, and other economies at which efficiency is missed.
Since the climate damages not only depend on cumulative emissions but also on the emissions path (Rogelj et al. 2011 and Walsh et al. 2017 ) the starting point of the present paper is a two-period model. Throughout the paper we assume that deposits are purchased (or leased) for preservation and not for extraction. 1 We consider a world with two (groups of) countries all of which extract, trade, and consume fossil fuel. All countries' carbon emissions from fuel extraction generate climate damage. However, only one group of countries makes use of policies to mitigate climate damage. This climate coalition caps fuel demand and supply in each period and purchases fossil fuel deposits to prevent their exploitation. The coalition may behave as price-taker or may strategically act in the fuel markets. Harstad (2012) models the deposit market as a set of bilateral trades to the mutual advantage of the trading partners. "The market clears when there exists no pair of countries that would both strictly benefit from trading some of their deposits at some price" (Harstad 2012, p. 92) . 2 In our paper these deposit transactions are implemented by a Nash bargaining solution. Our analysis reveals that the policy of purchasing deposits for preservation (depositpurchase policy) is inefficient both for price-taking and strategic action in the fuel market (Proposition 1 and 2) which is in stark contrast to its performance in static models (Eichner and Pethig 2017a) . The economic rationale lies in a non-internalized first-period climate damage externality. The group of non-signatories "extracts too much too early".
1 Harstad (2012, Section IV.B.) shows that his deposit purchases for preservation combined with deposit purchases for extraction also achieve efficiency in a two-period model. 2 On the consequences of market power at the deposit market in a static model we refer to Eichner and Pethig (2017b) .
To address the inefficiency we extend the coalition's policy space by leasing deposits for preservation. The deposit-lease policy turns out to be efficient if the coalition takes prices as given in the fuel markets (Proposition 3). In case of strategic action the deposit-lease policy is efficient for a subset of economies which is characterized in Proposition 4. Next, we compare the allocations and welfare levels in the games with deposit-purchase policy and deposit-lease policy when the coalition behaves strategically in the fuel markets and strategic action pays. For parametric functions we show that the deposit-lease policy decreases first-period extraction, increases second-period extraction and reduces total climate damage compared to the deposit-purchase policy. In an empirically calibrated economy the deposit-lease policy results in larger (total and coalition's) welfare if the discount rate is small. At small discount rates, the climate damage is large and the non-internalization of the first-period climate externality becomes more pronounced at the deposit-purchase policy, which makes the deposit-lease policy more favorable (Proposition 5). Propositions 1-5 rest on the assumption that the coalition can commit to future policies. However, we also employ that these Proposition 1-4 remain true if the coalition cannot commit to future policies (Proposition 6).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the model and characterizes the efficient allocation. Section 3 analyzes the game with the deposit-purchase policy. Section 4 investigates the game with the deposit-lease policy. Section 5 turns to a comparison of the deposit-lease policy with the deposit-purchase policy in an empirically calibrated economy.
Section 6 assumes that the coalition cannot commit to future policies and studies time consistent policies. Section 7 concludes.
The model
Consider a two-period model with two (groups of) countries M and N , where M is the climate coalition that acts as one agent and N is a representative non-signatory. Each country i = M, N derives the benefit B it (y it ) from consuming y it units of fuel in period t = 1, 2. The benefit function is increasing and concave (B ′ it > 0 and B ′′ it < 0). In each period each country produces the quantity x it of fuel from domestic energy deposits. The cost of extracting x i1 in period 1 is C i (x i1 ) and the cost of extracting x i2 in period 2 is
Emissions are proportional to fuel extraction and hence x it denotes both fuel supply and emissions. The coalition suffers the climate damage
where ψ ∈ [0, 1] is the ecological discount factor. The model is closed by the fuel market conditions
As a benchmark, we characterize the efficient allocation which follows from maximizing
subject to (1). In (2), δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor. Restricting our attention to an interior solution and attaching an asterisk to the solution values of (2) the first-order conditions are
The allocation rules (3a) require consumption efficiency in both periods. The rules (3b) and (3c) reflect overall efficiency in period 1 and 2, respectively. Extraction in period t should be increased until its marginal consumption benefits equal its marginal costs. In period 1 the marginal costs of x i1 consists of four components. Enhancing x i1 increases first the extraction costs in period 1,
, third the marginal climate damage in period 1, H ′ , and fourth by the fuel it stores and the cost of extracting the fuel. Each deposit stores a very small unit of fuel and these deposits are ordered according to their extraction costs. In formal terms, the cost of extracting the infinitesimally small unit of fuel in the x th i deposit is C ′ i (x i ). We denote country i's total endowment of deposits by 0, ∞ C ′ i and the cost of extracting the deposits in some interval
Country N is the owner of the deposits 0, ∞ C ′ N and can extract the fuel stored in the deposits or can sell the deposits to the coalition.
The game
In the sequel we analyze the game. In Section 3-5 we assume that the coalition commits to its future policies.
4 At the beginning of period t = 1 the coalition and the non-signatory contract. They bargain over deposits purchased for preservation in some interval ξ, ξ] C ′ N and the deposit price p z . In period t = 1 the coalition chooses its first-and second-period fuel demand and supply caps, and the first-period fuel market clears. In period t = 2 the secondperiod fuel market clears. The non-signatory is price taker in the fuel markets, whereas the coalition may either take prices as given or behave strategically in the fuel markets. 5 Fuel is internationally traded, and in each period t = 1, 2 the fuel market equilibrates at the fuel price p t . The game is solved by backward induction.
Fuel market equilibria in the first and second period. To derive the first-and second-period fuel market equilibria we determine country N 's first-and second-period fuel demand and supply. Country N 's fuel demand follows from maximizing the intertemporal utility of its representative consumer
with respect to y N t for t = 1, 2. In (4), K(x N 1 , ξ, ξ) and
country N 's extraction costs in period 1 and 2, respectively, after having sold the deposits
to country M , p t is the fuel price in period t = 1, 2, z := ξ − ξ is the number of sold deposits, and p z z is N 's revenue from selling the deposits. The first-order conditions of 4 The case that the coalition cannot commit to its future policies is discussed in Section 6. 5 Strategic action of country N would not qualitatively change our results. For a further discussion of these assumptions we refer to Harstad (2012, p. 103 ff) . x N 2 = 0 we assume x N 1 < ξ such that the first-period marginal extraction cost is not affected by the deposit transactions and
The overall marginal extraction cost function is given by
Taking advantage of the marginal cost functions C
ing (4) with respect to x N 1 and x N 2 yields
The first-order conditions (7) and (8) determine country N 's first-period fuel supply
and country N 's total fuel supply
Combining (7) and (8) we obtain the Hotelling rule for country N 's optimal first-and second-period extraction. In the sequel we refer to
as Hotelling price.
Accounting for (5), (9) and (10) the fuel market clearing conditions in the first and second period, respectively, are 
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(11) and (12) determine the fuel prices p 1 and p 2 as functions of y M 1 , x M 1 , y M 2 , x M 2 , ξ and ξ, formally
The properties of (13) and (14) with respect to y M 1 , x M 1 , y M 2 and x M 2 are derived in the Appendix A1.
It remains to specify the coalition's choice of its first-and second-period fuel caps. The coalition maximizes with respect to y M 1 , x M 1 , y M 2 , x M 2 its welfare
subject to (13) and (14). The first-order conditions are
where
Deposit contract. Finally, we turn to the deposit contract. The coalition wants to buy deposits for preservation. The two groups negotiate over the number of deposits
and the deposit price p z . The outcome of negotiations is efficient.
That is, once an agreement is reached there is no room for re-negotiations such that both parties can be made better off. As is well known the efficient contract can be implemented by Nash bargaining.
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The coalition buys only deposits that country N would have extracted in the absence of deposit trading. The highest-cost deposit, ξ, that country N would have exploited in the absence of deposit trade follows from maximizing country N 's welfare
with respect to ξ. The associated first-order condition yields
Without deposit trading country N extracts all profitable deposits from the interval
Allowing for deposit trade country N keeps extracting its low-cost deposits and sells only its highest-cost profitable deposits. Formally, with deposit trade its total fuel supply
where z is the number of sold deposits. Denoting by p z the deposit price, the welfare of country N and M , respectively, is
The coalition and the non-signatory simultaneously bargain over the number of deposits z and the price p z . The Nash bargaining solves the following maximization problem
9 Harstad (2012) also considers efficient deposit trade but leaves the bargaining process unspecified. For the sake of more specific results we restrict our attention to the (cooperative) Nash bargaining.
subject to (19) and (20) . In (21), b ∈ [0, 1] represents the coalition's bargaining power, and
are the disagreement welfares of M and N , i.e. the welfare levels the countries achieve in the equilibrium without deposit trading. The first-order conditions of (21) yield
To sum up, the coalition purchases the number of deposits z = ξ − ξ from the interval
. Inserting ξ and ξ in (13) and (14) determines the fuel prices, and solving (16) establishes the equilibrium of the game.
Allocative inefficiency
In this subsection we investigate whether the deposit-purchase policy implements the efficient allocation. Before we discuss the impact of strategic action in the fuel markets, we consider the special case of perfect competition, i.e. the coalition behaves as price taker, in the fuel markets. In formal terms, the absence of strategic action is readily established by
In view of (5), (7), (8), (16) and (22), the equilibrium of the game is characterized by
Comparing (23a)- (23e) with the efficiency conditions (3a)- (3c) shows that the depositpurchase policy leads to consumption efficiency and overall efficiency in both periods for the coalition. Whereas the deposit-purchase policy also attains overall efficiency for country N 's second-period extraction ((3c) for i = N is equal to (23e)), the allocation rule for country N 's first-period extraction (23c) does not match with the efficient one ((3b) for i = N ) and hence the overall efficiency of country N 's first-period extraction is missed. To put it differently, the deposit purchases for preservation induce country N to account for the 10 The derivation of (22) can be found in the Appendix A2.
coalition's climate damage when extracting in period 2. In contrast, the deposit purchases do not provide the appropriate incentives for country N 's first-period extraction.
In the Appendix A3 we proof the differences between the efficient allocation, marked by an asterix * , and the (inefficient) equilibrium of the game with deposit-purchase policy, marked by a star ⋆ , and compare them in Table 1 . Table 1 : Social optimum versus deposit-purchase policy (non-strategic action in the fuel markets)
The main difference between the efficient allocation and the allocation with depositpurchase policy is that the first-period climate damage externality is internalized in the former case whereas it is non-internalized in the latter case. Table 1 reveals that in the transition from the deposit-purchase policy to the social optimum country N 's first-period fuel extraction decreases (x * N 1 < x ⋆ N 1 ) and first-period total extraction reduces 11 (x equilibrium of the game is characterized by
In addition to the inefficiency discussed at price-taking there are additional distortions stemming from the strategic effects SE B1 and SE B2 . Comparing (24a)- (24f) with (3a)-(3c) reveals that the coalition's strategic action destroys consumption efficiency in both periods which aggravates the prevailing inefficiency of the game. Hence, we get Proposition 2 . Suppose the coalition implements the climate policy of purchasing deposits for preservation and suppose the coalition acts strategically in the fuel markets.
Then the equilibrium of the game is inefficient.
The performance of the deposit-purchase policy in the present two-period model is in stark contrast to its performance in a static (one-period) model. Whereas the deposit-purchase policy is able to achieve efficiency for a subset of economies in a static model (Eichner and Pethig 2017a, Proposition 2), the extension to two (or more) periods leaves the depositpurchase policy inefficient. In a two-period model the deposit-purchase policy is inefficient due to a non-internalized first-period climate damage externality and due to (possibly prevailing) strategic effects.
Deposit-lease policy
In this section, we extend country M 's deposit policy. In particular, the coalition and the non-signatory still bargain over purchased deposits, which are then permanently preserved from extraction, but they also bargain over leased deposits in some interval [ξ 1 , ξ 1 ] C ′ N and the leased deposits' price p z1 . These deposits are preserved in period 1 and can be extracted by the non-signatory in period 2. We denote the number of leased deposits by z 1 := ξ 1 − ξ 1 , and refer to the deposit policy of the present section as deposit-lease policy. 
The game
Fuel market equilibria in the first and second period. With the possibility of leasing deposits and assuming x N 1 < ξ, (4) becomes
costs in period 1 and 2 after having leased and sold the deposits
country M , respectively, and p z1 z 1 is N 's revenue from leasing the deposits. Maximizing (25) with respect to y N 1 and y N 2 yields country N 's fuel demand (5).
Turning to country N 's fuel supply, leasing deposits
does not change N 's total endowment of deposits, because these deposits are returned to N in period 2. Thus, neither the total marginal cost function K ′ (x N 1 + x N 2 , ξ, ξ) nor the total fossil fuel supply function S(p 2 , ξ, ξ) are affected by the extension of country M 's deposit policy. However, the lease of deposits does change N 's first-period endowment of deposits such that N 's first-period marginal cost function is given by Figure 1 illustrates the marginal cost functions C
is captured by the line 0ADE. Since the leased deposit are given back to N in the second period, its total marginal cost function (6) and (26), and maximizing the welfare (25) with respect to x N 1 and x N 2 yields N 's first-period fuel supply
From (5), (10) and (27) the fuel market equilibria are given by
(28) and (29) determine the fuel prices p 1 and p 2 as functions of
and ξ, formally
13 The properties of (30) and (31) with respect to I 1 and I 2 are equivalent to those of (13) and (14).
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The coalition's fuel caps y M 1 , x M 1 , y M 2 , x M 2 follow from maximizing its welfare
subject to (30) and (31). The resulting first-order conditions are
Deposit contract. The deposit transactions now consist of the number of leased deposits, z 1 , and the number of purchased deposits for preservation, z. The negotiated deposit prices are p z1 and p z . Again, the bargaining problem is solved by applying the Nash solution.
To determine the deposit transactions z 1 and z, we need to know how much country N would extract in period 1 and 2, if there were no deposit trade. N 's fuel extraction in the absence of deposit trading ξ 1 and ξ − ξ 1 , respectively, follows from maximizing
with respect to ξ 1 and ξ. The first-order conditions yield
The welfare levels U o M and U o N that M and N achieve in the game without deposit transactions serve as disagreement point of the Nash bargaining game.
With deposit trading country N keeps extracting its low-cost deposits in each period, leases the highest-cost deposits that would otherwise have been extracted in period 1 and sells the highest-cost deposits that would otherwise have been extracted in period 2, formally
The welfare of N and M is then given by
The deposit contract negotiated by the Nash bargaining solution follows from
subject to (39) and (40). In the Appendix A4 we show that the first-order conditions imply
The coalition leases the number of deposits
, where
, and purchases the number of deposits z =
. Accounting for ξ 1 , ξ 1 , ξ and ξ in (30) and (31) determines the fuel prices p 1 and p 2 , and solving (33) establishes the equilibrium of the game.
Allocative (in)efficiency
In this subsection, we wish to answer the question whether the deposit-lease policy leads to efficient equilibria. Again, we begin with assuming that the coalition behaves as price taker in the fuel markets. Making use of SE L1 = SE L2 ≡ 0, (42) and (43) in (5) and (33), the equilibrium of the game is characterized by
(44a)-(44c) are equivalent to the efficiency conditions (3a)-(3c). The deposit-lease policy enables the coalition to internalizes the climate damage externalities of country N 's fuel extraction. The deposit contract is designed such that country N accounts for the climate damage its first-period and second-period extraction imposes on the coalition. Thus, we conclude Proposition 3 . Suppose the coalition implements the climate policy of leasing deposits for preservation and suppose the coalition takes the fuel prices as given. Then the equilibrium of the game is efficient.
If the coalition acts strategically in the fuel markets, the equilibrium of the game is characterized by
In contrast to (24a)-(24f) that violate overall efficiency for country N in case of the depositpurchase policy, the possibility of leasing deposits leads to overall efficiency for both countries. However, consumption efficiency may be destroyed depending on whether the coalition may improve or not by strategic action. Defining
we prove in the Appendix A5
Proposition 4 . Suppose the coalition implements the climate policy of leasing and purchasing deposits for preservation and suppose the coalition acts strategically in the fuel markets. Then the equilibrium of the game is efficient if and only if E ∈ E O .
To grasp an intuition for Proposition 4 we analyze how the coalition's welfare changes when starting from price taking in the fuel markets, which is tantamount to the efficient allocation 14 The definition of I * 1 and I * 2 is given in the Appendix A5.
according to Proposition 3, the fuel caps x M 1 and x M 2 are marginally decreased or increased
The comparative static effects of dx M 1 and dx M 2 result in welfare changes that trace back to changes of export revenues or import payments in both periods. dw F t captures this terms of trade effect of dx M t . In addition, there is a welfare effect that goes back to changes of the climate damage. dw Ht represents the climate damage effect of dx M t .
We study the welfare changes exemplarily for a coalition that exports fuel in both periods (I * 1 < 0 and I * 2 < 0). Note that at the social optimum the points D and F in Figure  1 are country N 's marginal extraction costs of the efficient fuel quantities x * N 1 and x * N 1 +x * N 2 , respectively. We begin with checking whether dx M 1 > 0 increases welfare. Increasing x M 1 reduces the first-period fuel price (P 1 x M 1 < 0) and hence N moves from point D in direction to point A in Figure 1 . As a consequence, country N 's first-period fuel supply, total fuel supply and the second-period fuel price do not change (S
. Making use of this information in (46a) the terms of trade effect is negative (dw F 1 < 0) and the climate damage effect vanishes (dw H1 = 0) such that total welfare decreases and a strategic increase of x M 1 does not pay.
Next, consider the welfare effects of dx M 1 < 0. In that case the first-period fuel price, the second-period fuel price and the Hotelling price
)dx M 1 > 0) and country N moves from point D to point E in period 1 and from point F to point G in period 2 (see Figure 1) . The price increases induce country N to expand its first-period fuel supply and total fuel supply (S ′ * 1 > 0, S ′ * > 0). In view of (46a) the terms of trade effect is positive dw F 1 > 0 and the climate damage effect is negative. Reducing x M 1 is advantageous and hence strategic action pays for the coalition if the positive terms of trade effect overcompensates the negative climate damage effect.
It remains to investigate the welfare effects of changing the coalition's second-period fuel cap. dx M 2 < 0 increases the second-period fuel price p 2 and does not affect the firstperiod fuel price, which induces country N to leave its first-period fuel supply unaltered (S ′ 1 = 0, remaining at point D) and to expand its total fuel supply (S ′ > 0, movement from point F to point G). Here, we get a positive terms of trade effect and a negative climate damage effect. Strategic action does not pay if the negative climate damage effect overcompensates the positive terms of trade effect. For dx M 2 > 0 prices in both periods decline, such that export revenues decline and dw F 2 < 0 (movements from point D to point A and from point F to point B). Furthermore, the Hotelling price increases such that extraction is shifted from the second to the first period, which implies dw H2 < 0. Thus, a strategic increase of x M 2 does not pay. A rigorous analysis of all cases can be found in the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix A5.
Two remarks are in order with respect to Proposition 4. First, if countries are identical which implies no exports and imports, then the equilibrium is efficient, i.e. I * 1 = I * 2 constitutes an economy E ∈ E O . Second, the deposit-lease policy does not always implement the efficient allocation. In all feasible economies E ∈ E O strategic action pays and the equilibrium of the game is inefficient.
Deposit-lease versus deposit-purchase policy
In the previous sections we pointed out that the deposit-purchase policy cannot implement the efficient allocation, whereas the deposit-lease policy implements the efficient allocation if the coalition takes the fuel prices as given and can implement the efficient allocation if the coalition acts strategically in the fuel markets. In our view the most interesting and most relevant comparison, which is conducted in the present section, is between the deposit-purchase and deposit-lease policy when the coalition behaves strategically in the fuel markets, strategic action pays, and both policies result in inefficient outcomes.
For the sake of specific results, we turn to the parametric functions
for i = M, N , t = 1, 2, where α, b, c M , c N , h are positive parameters and where x t := x M t +x N t is total extraction in period t = 1, 2 and x := x 1 + x 2 is total extraction in both periods.
For the parametric functions we define the sets Table 2 . Table 2 : Deposit-lease versus deposit-purchase policy (strategic action in the fuel market)
At the deposit-purchase policy the first-period climate damage externality remains noninternalized and there are additional distortions stemming from strategic action. As the third   table of Table 2 shows when moving from the deposit-purchase policy to the deposit-lease policy fuel extraction is postponed from the first period to the second period and the climate damage is reduced. 16 This effects harks back to the internalization of the climate damage externality. The strategic effects destroy consumption efficiency since at both policies the coalition aims to manipulate the fuel prices in its favor. In the transition from the depositpurchase policy to the deposit-lease policy the climate welfare (which equals the negative climate damage) raises, which ceteris paribus increases total welfare. Consumption welfare also changes.
If the coalition imports fuel (c M > c N ) it aims to reduce the fuel price. 17 The transition from the deposit-purchase policy to the deposit-lease policy reduces total consumption welfare. The reason lies in the vertical segment AD of N 's marginal cost curve which corresponds to a vertical segment of N 's first-period fuel supply at the deposit-lease policy. At that segment N 's supply is price-inelastic and the coalition ceteris paribus achieves large price reductions without changing the total extraction. At the deposit-lease policy the coalition's strategic incentives (at the margin) are much stronger than at the deposit-purchase policy. Stronger incentives result in larger (consumption) distortions and hence the consumption welfare is smaller at the deposit-lease policy than at the deposit-purchase policy.
The change of total welfare consists of two countervailing effects -the total consumption welfare declines and the climate welfare increases. If the difference of strategic benefits is small [large] and the gain of climate welfare at the deposit-lease policy is large [small] then the total welfare increases [decreases] when moving from the deposit-purchase policy to the deposit-lease policy. If the gain of climate welfare is sufficiently large, i.e. the climate damage is sufficiently high, then the deposit-lease policy becomes welfare-superior. (2017, 2018) . The discount rate ranges from r = 2.5% to r = 5%. Delegating the technical details to the Appendix C, the main result is highlighted in Figure 2 that illustrates the welfare difference when moving from the deposit-lease policy to the deposit 20 purchase policy. The total welfare increases in the transition from the deposit-purchase policy to the deposit-lease policy for discount rates smaller than r = 2.7%. To get an intuition for that result, recall that consumption (climate) welfare declines (increases) in the transition from the deposit-purchase policy to the deposit-lease policy, and that the depositlease policy is advantageous if the climate damage is sufficiently high. As the Appendix C reveals, the marginal climate damage h is large at small discount rates, and hence the loss of consumption welfare is overcompensated by the gain in climate welfare when moving from the deposit-purchase to the deposit-lease policy. The marginal climate damage decreases in the discount rate which explains why the deposit-purchase policy becomes favorable for higher discount rates.
Moreover, the Appendix C shows that the transition from the deposit-purchase policy to the deposit-lease policy increases the coalition's welfare whenever total welfare rises. We summarize our results in Proposition 5 . Suppose the coalition acts strategically in the fuel markets and strate-
(i) In the parametric model the transition from the deposit-purchase policy to the depositlease policy reduces first-period extraction, increases second-period extraction, reduces total extraction and reduces the climate damage.
(ii) In the calibrated model the transition from the deposit-purchase policy to the depositlease policy increases the coalition's welfare and total welfare if and only if the discount rate r is smaller than 2.7%.
Time consistent second-period fuel caps
So far we assumed that the coalition can commit to its future policies. Now we dispense with that assumption. If the coalition cannot commit, the second-period fuel caps of Sections 3-5 are time inconsistent. To derive time consistent policies we modify the timing of the game as follows: At the beginning of period t = 1 the coalition and the non-signatory negotiate over deposits. Next, in period t = 1 the coalition and the non-signatory choose their first-period fuel demand and supply, and then the first-period fuel market clears. In period t = 2 the groups M and N choose their second-period fuel demand and supply, and the second-period fuel market clears. We go quickly through the game by backward induction.
In the second period the coalition maximizes with respect to y M 2 , x M 2 its welfare
subject to the price function p 2 =P 2 (x M 2 , y M 2 , x N 1 ), which follows from the second-period fuel equilibrium condition (12).
18 The first-order conditions are
In the first period the coalition maximizes with respect to x M 1 and y M 1 its welfare
subject to
, · , the fuel equilibrium conditions (11) and (12), and the first-order conditions (51a) and (51b).
19 The first-order conditions are
18 In (12) we have replaced S 1 p1−δp2 1−δ , · by x N 1 , since x N 1 already has been chosen at period t = 1 and cannot be affected by the coalition at t = 2. The first-order conditions (7) and (8) also apply when N chooses x N 1 in period 1 and x N 2 in period 2.
19 For more details we refer to the Appendix A7.
It is interesting to observe that the second-period fuel caps are used to influence only the second-period fuel price (and not the first-period fuel price), if M cannot commit. In contrast, the first-period fuel caps are used to manipulate both the first-and second-period fuel prices, and M takes into account that its first-period fuel caps affect its second-period fuel caps reflected by the terms
in (53a) and (53b).
At the beginning of period 1 M and N negotiate over deposits. The deposit contracts under commitment also apply here. For the deposit-purchase policy the contract is characterized by (22) . In case of the deposit-lease policy the contract satisfies (42) and (43).
In the remainder of this section we investigate the (in)efficiency of the deposit policies, if M cannot commit. We begin with the deposit-purchase policy. If the coalition acts as price taker in the fuel markets (P
, (53a), (53b)), it is straightforward to show that the allocation rules of the game coincide with (23a)-(23e) and the equilibrium of the game is inefficient. The reason for the inefficiency lies in a non-internalized first-period climate damage externality. If the coalition acts strategically in the fuel markets the inefficiency deteriorates. In case of the deposit-lease policy one can show that price taking (P (53a), (53b)) leads to the allocation rules (44a) and (44c), and hence implements efficiency. Finally, for the deposit-lease policy and strategic action in the fuel markets we derive in Appendix A7 an analogue to Proposition 4. These results are summarized in Proposition 6 . Suppose the coalition cannot commit to its future policies, (i) it pursues a deposit-purchase policy and suppose it takes the fuel prices as given. Then the equilibrium of the game is inefficient. The transition from the social optimum to the deposit-purchase policy increases first-period extraction, reduces second-period extraction and increases the climate damage.
(ii) it pursues a deposit-purchase policy and suppose it acts strategically in the fuel markets.
(iii) it pursues a deposit-lease policy and suppose it takes the fuel prices as given. Then the equilibrium of the game is efficient.
(iv) it pursues a deposit-purchase policy and suppose it acts strategically in the fuel markets. Then the equilibrium of the game is efficient if and only if
7 Summary and discussion
This paper compares the policies of leasing versus purchasing deposits to prevent their exploitation in a two-period model at which a (sub-global) climate coalition fights against climate damage and aims to manipulate the fuel prices in its favor. In that two-period model not only cumulative emissions but also the emissions path determines climate damages. It turns out that the deposit-purchase policy always leads to inefficiency which is in stark contrast to its performance in static models. The drawback of the deposit-purchase policy is a non-internalized first-period climate damage externality. The deposit-lease policy performs better. It implements efficiency, if the coalition is price taker in the fuel markets, and it achieves efficiency in a subset of economies, if the coalition acts strategically in the fuel markets. Our results are independent on whether the coalition can or cannot commit to future policies. So far our analysis provides an economic rationale for leasing instead of buying deposits for preservation.
20
Next, we compare the economies that are inefficient for both the deposit-lease and the deposit-purchase policy. Presupposed the coalition imports fuel, the deposit-lease policy results in larger [smaller] (total and coalition's) welfare than the deposit-purchase policy, if the climate damage is large [small], because leasing improves the possibility to manipulate downward the fuel price in the first period. In an empirically calibrated economy the depositlease policy is welfare-superior to the deposit-purchase policy if the discount rate is small. In any case the transition from the deposit-purchase policy to the deposit-lease policy flattens the extraction path.
For the benefit of informative results we followed Harstad (2012) and Eichner and Pethig (2017a) in seeking analytical relief by employing additive, quasi-linear consumer preferences and, more importantly, by assuming that the non-signatory does suffer from climate damage. Furthermore, our analysis can be extended into other directions. First, one could introduce strategic action in the deposit market. Second, one could address aspects of incomplete information and moral hazard with respect to the deposits. Third, one could add a renewable resource. Fourth, a comprehensive comparison between leasing and buying deposits for preservation needs a computable general equilibrium model that is empirically calibrated. These issues are beyond the scope of the present paper but may be interesting and important tasks for future research.
20 There is another argument for leasing, namely the threat of nationalization. As Harstad (2012) argues:
"after selling a deposit located within its national boundary, a country may have a strong in incentive to nationalize the deposit and recapture its value."
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Appendix A. Proofs
A1: The properties of P 1 and P 2 from (13) and (14): Total differentiation of (11) and (12) yields
Solving (A1) and (A2) with respect to dp 1 and dp 2 we get dp 1 dy M 1 = − dp 1 dx M 1 = δS
A2: Derivation of (22): Maximizing S from (21) with respect to p z and z, we obtain the following first-order conditions
Taking advantage of (A7) in (A8) we get
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Using U M pz=0 := U M + p z z and U N pz=0 := U N − p z z in (A7) yields
A3: Proof of Proposition 1, equilibrium allocation of the social optimum compared to that of the deposit-purchase policy without strategic action: Using (3a) in (3c) as well as using (23a) in (23d) and (23e) yields
Thus,
Furthermore, using (3c) in (3b) as well as using (23d) and (23e) in (23b) and (23c) yields
at the social optimum, 0 at the deposit-purchase policy.
In what follows, we distinguish between four cases concerning H
A4: Derivation of (42) and (43): Maximizing S from (41) with respect to p z and z yields (A9). Maximizing it with respect to p z1 and z 1 , we obtain the following first-order
Taking advantage of (A15) in (A16) we get
From
A5: Proof of Proposition 4, conditions for non-strategic action with a depositlease policy: Evaluating the partial derivatives of (40) with respect to y M 1 and y M 2 at the first-best equilibrium values yields
and
where A6: Conditions for non-strategic action with a deposit-purchase policy: For the comparison of the policies in Section 5, we need to know the conditions for non-strategic action with a deposit-purchase policy in the parametric model. We prepare this analysis by deriving the respective conditions in general. Denoting by ⋆ the deposit-purchase equilibrium values without strategic action and evaluating the partial derivatives of (20) with respect to y M 1 and y M 2 at these second-best equilibrium values yields
Now we analyze how M 's welfare changes if it alters its fuel policy. For dy M 1 > 0 (=⇒
Evaluating (52) at the first best equilibrium yields
where 
35 Evaluating (52) at the first best equilibrium yields . Concerning oil production in period 2, we assume that without policy intervention all proved reserves will be extracted until the year 2090. From EIA (2018), we find that the proved reserves were 1651bb in 2016 and from EIA (2017), we find that oil production in the years from 2016 to 2050 will be 1092bb, such that we use x 2 = 559bb. From
, we then get x M 2 = 123bb and x N 2 = 436bb. In accordance with IEA (2013, p.228), we use 100$b for the production costs per billion barrel of oil in period 2. From 100$b = c i (x i1 + x i2 ) for i = M, N , we can then calculate c M and c N . Using these in (C2) and (C3), we find expressions of α and b depending on δ, where we choose δ = 1 1.03 40 = 37% as reference case. We summarize all parameter values in Table 3 . Table 4 shows the allocation under the deposit-lease and deposit-purchase policy, respectively. Table 5 reports the differences in total welfare (U ), consumption welfare (U F ) and climate welfare (U H ) at the policies. From (A11) and (A19), the differences in country M 's welfare and country N 's welfare at the policies are proportional to the differences in total welfare:
Since the climate damage and the qualitative difference in total welfare depends on the discount rate, we can find an expression for the latter deepening on the discount rate.
Using the three values of h and ψ from Table 3 , we first estimate functions of the climate damage parameters depending on r: 
Using these functions, we can then calculate the total welfare difference depending on r, which we plot in Figure 2 . The function becomes negative at r ≈ 2.7%, declines monotonically until r ≈ 3.7% and converges towards zero afterwards. For high discount rates, the climate damage becomes negligible, deposit purchases and leases converge to zero and the quantities coincide with both policies.
21 For ψ(r) = a ψ + β ψ (γ ψ ) 100r , e.g., we have ψ(2.5) = 1.169, ψ(3) = 0.870, ψ(5) = 0.646. For h(r) = a h + β h (γ h ) 100r , we would get h(r) = −0.32 + 42 · 0.54 100r , such that the climate damage would become negative for r > 8%. Thus, we choose h(r) = β h (γ h ) 100r and minimize the sum of quadratic differences over β h and γ h .
